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We analyze the dynamics of public and private sector employment, using the natural
experiment provided by the partial privatization of the Bangladeshi jute industry. A
differences-in-differences approach allows us to infer ownership effects. Although the public
sector had substantial excess employment of workers initially, this excess was substantially
eroded by the end of the period we study. This finding is consistent with the idea that the
central authorities, which were increasingly financially constrained, used yardstick
competition to reduce public sector managerial rents. The extent of such erosion differs
between white-collar and manual worker categories, with excess employment persisting only
in the former.
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1. Introduction
This paper uses firm level data from the jute industry in Bangladesh over the 1983-
1994 in order to analyze the effects of ownership upon employment in a dynamic setting. In
1982 the military regime in Bangladesh privatized 31 of the 62 mills in the jute industry,
while retaining the remainder in the public sector. This natural experiment provides a unique
opportunity to study the effects of ownership structure on economic performance.  
Our main findings are presented in terms of measures of public sector “excess
employment”. We have two alternative measures, depending on whether it adjusts for output
or not. The adjusted measure shows excess employment in all categories in 1988, but this
excess is eliminated in the manual worker category by the end of the period. For white-collar
workers, excess employment is reduced, but continues to be significant. We argue that this
dynamic pattern is consistent with changes in the macroeconomic environment and with the
notion of yardstick competition, where central authorities use information on private sector
behavior to constrain public sector managers. Our second substantive finding, that white-
collar workers are the main beneficiaries of public sector employment generation demands a
fuller explanation.
2. Background & Data
In 1982, the government of General Ershad initiated the New Industrial Policy, under
which over 650 enterprises were privatized. In the jute industry, 31 of the 62 mills were
privatized, while the remainder was retained in the public sector. This policy was dubbed  "re-
privatization". This was a partial reversal of the nationalization of the jute industry3
implemented in 1972, soon after the independence of Bangladesh.  The jute mills that were
owned by Bangladeshi nationals at the time of nationalization were returned to their former
owners, while the mills that had belonged to West Pakistani nationals, continued to remain
under public ownership. The selection of mills to be privatized was not based on any
economic criterion, but rather on the nationality of their former owners. Hence our analysis of
the effects of privatization upon employment are not subject to selection bias.
Previous work by Bhaskar and Khan (1985) compared employment levels in 1988 and
1983 and found that public sector mills had "excess employment" of white-collar workers, of
the order of 35%. There was no significant difference in the employment of manual workers
between public and private sectors. In the period we study (1988-94), the jute sector was
under increasing financial pressure. The financial losses accumulated in private and public
sector firms were financed primarily by loans from publicly owned banks. The situation was
not simple a result of mismanagement, but a followed decline in external demand for
Bangladeshi jute products. By 1994 industry output had collapsed by 20 percent relative to
1988. 
The World Bank was engaged in negotiations with the government to reduce capacity
in the jute industry. The government instituted a Voluntary Departure Scheme for staff and
workers in the public mills. In July 1989 the benefits for departure from state owned
enterprises were increased substantially. For example, an employee with 30 years service was
entitled to 5 years pay as gratuity, in addition to pension benefits. Public sector employees
responded positively to these redundancy packages, especially after July 1990. Four state
sector mills were closed down in 1993 and a number of additional privatizations were planned
but did not materialize. These measures culminated in the World Bank’s Jute Sector4
Adjustment Credit program of 1994, which financed restructuring of the industry and met the
costs of the Voluntary Departure Scheme.
Our data consists of mill-specific employment levels of four categories of workers for
the years 1983, 1988, 1991, 1992 and 1994. The first two categories, managers and clerical
staff, are white collar. We also have data on permanent manual workers and total manual
workers (permanent plus casual). The data was collected from records kept by the Bangladesh
Jute Mills Corporation and the Bangladesh Jute Mills Association, organizations representing
public and private sector mills respectively. As privatized mills were legally unable to layoff
employees for a year after their privatization in 1982, the recorded 1983 figures may be taken
to be the pre-privatization figure. We should point out that the data on manual is less reliable
than our data on the white-collar categories in the period after 1988.  For manual workers, our
data shows the numbers registered as employed. These workers are divided in three
categories- permanent, temporary and casual. This was a period of substantial production and
employment volatility and independent anecdotal evidence suggests that registered
employment reported by the mills differed to some extent from the numbers actually
employed. Manual workers who availed of the Voluntary Departure Scheme and left do not
seem to be immediately reflected in registered employment of blue-collar workers over this
period. These problems do not apply to officers and staff, since employment of these
categories does not vary on a daily basis. Moreover, since smaller numbers of more important
personnel were involved, this data was reliably reported by firms.
3. The Model
Our analysis uses the private sector mills as the benchmark. The objective function of
privately owned mills is relatively straightforward. We assume that these owners maximize5
profits and do not have any preference for employment-maximization. We also assume that
principal-agent problems between owners and managers are minor. The number of owners is
usually only one, and at most a few, and hence there are no free-rider problems in monitoring
managers. Owners are also actively involved in management and therefore asymmetric
information (which could be a source of manager rents) is largely absent.
There is less general agreement about what constitutes a reasonable objective function
for the public sector firm. It will be useful to make a distinction between the central
authorities as principals and the firm level managers who are their agents. Both central
authorities and firm level managers may have a preference for employment creation.
However, it seems that the pressures for employment creation are more severe at local rather
than at central level. In particular, local politicians may pressurize public firms to create
employment for politically important constituencies, a phenomenon we call "clientelism". 
1
Additionally, the public sector managers may wish to dole out jobs to those with whom they
are connected by bonds of kinship or social affinity. For both these reason, public sector
enterprises tend to be biased towards expanding white-collar employment rather than
employment of manual workers. The firm level manager's ability to expand employment is
subject to constraints and incentives imposed by the central authorities. The problem central
                                                
Clientelism refers to a situation, where politicians dole out public sector jobs in order to
maintain their political support base. Bhaskar and Khan (1995) argue that this explanation for
public sector excess employment in the white-collar sections is more plausible than a
"welfarist" explanation, which would generate excess employment among manual rather than
white-collar workers. Clientelism can be augmented by sociological factors, whereby top
managers in the public sector create jobs for the middle classes to whom they are tied by
bonds of kinship or social affinity.6
authorities face is that they lack information on local employment requirements, which is
available only to the managers.
Let us consider the implications of this conflict between the central authorities and public firm
managers, and the role of yardstick competition in this context. To do this formally, we adapt
the standard model of regulation (see for example, Laffont and Tirole (1994)). We consider a
one period scenario and assume that the central authorities would like to have employment in
firm  i,  Ei, set equal to Zi, where Zi is the socially optimal level of employment. The
preferences of central authorities are given by
V(Ei) = -(Ei-Zi)
2 – t
Where t is the payment made to the manager. However, the central authorities do not know
the level of Zi , which is known only to the manager of the public firm. The central authorities
have the information that Zi = Z+ei where Z is distributed with a density function f on the 
interval  [a,b] and ei is distributed with a density function g on  the interval [-e,e]. Z and ei are
independently distributed. It follows that Zi has support [a-e,b+e].
The manager would like to create extra employment, beyond that desired by the central
authorities and the manager’s preferences are given by
U(Ei,t) = -c[Ei-(Zi+k)]
2 + t
Where k>0 is a parameter which measures the degree of employment bias of the manager. t is
the amount of transfer (or incentive pay) made from the central authorities to the manager – it
could also measure other incentive measures, such as promotions.  The central authorities can
provide incentives by making t depend upon on  Ei , so that we can write t(Ei ). c is a
parameter, which measures the relative importance of employment objectives compared to
money in the manager’s utility function.7
The manager has some outside level of reservation utility, u, and the central
authorities must ensure that he gets this utility level regardless of the realization of Zi.
The manager’s first order condition for utility maximization is
2c[Ei-Zi-k)] = t’(Ei)
From this condition, it is clear that if the central authority  sets t’(Ei) = -2ck, the manager will
find it optimal to Ei = Zi . In other words,  the central authorities can provide incentives so that
the manager chooses employment optimally (i.e. without any excess bias), by taxing
employment at rate 2ck. Let
t(Ei) = T –2ckEi. 
Where T is the fixed (wage) element of the manager’s compensation. The utility of the
manager under the scheme, given that he chooses employment optimally, is
 given by t(Ei) -  ck
2, which must exceed his reservation utility u for all possible values of Ei. 
His utility is lowest when employment is highest, i.e. when Zi = b+e. This implies that the
manager’s fixed component is given by
T = u + ck
2+ 2ck(b+e)
Notice that for any value of  Zi , the manager gets a rent of  2ck(b+e-Zi), which is strictly
positive unless desired employment is at its highest possible level.  That is, the central
authorities  have to make costly transfers in order to provide incentives, i.e. the
manager gets a payment which is in general above his reservation utility u. The
expected cost to the central authorities of this incentive scheme can be computed, and
is given by
E(C) = u +2ck[b+e- E(Z)] + ck
28
E(Z)] is the expectation of Z. If the provision of incentives is sufficiently costly, the central
authorities may prefer to provide low incentives, in which case there will be excess
employment.
Yardstick competition
Yardstick competition may play a useful role in the context, as has been noted in the
regulatory context (see  Sobel (1999),  Shleifer (1985) and Laffont and Tirole (1994)), if  there
are many public sector firms. In this case, the central authorities can provide incentives by
taxing only the excess employment of an individual firm relative to that industry average, or
the employment level of  other firms. Under such a scheme, it can be verified that the cost of
providing incentives is given by
C’ = u +2cke + ck
2
In comparing C with C’, we find that the central authorities have a cost reduction equal to
2ck[b- E(Z)] , i.e. they are able to reduce managerial informational rents. If all public
sector managers act individualistically, then yardstick competition can play a useful
role even in the absence of the private sector.
However, such incentives schemes for the public sector are vulnerable to collusion
between the managers of different public enterprises. Managers could all be better off if they
increased employment in a coordinated way. As managers are only penalized for raising
employment relative to the industry average, none of them will be punished. Such collusion
need not be explicit – there may well be a culture in the public sector of not pursuing
aggressive employment cuts and a manager who deviates from this may well become quite
unpopular. Such a social sanction may well make yardstick competition ineffectual when it is
restricted to the public sector.9
It is in this context that privatization can play a useful role. Notice that the managers in
the private sector will seek to maximize profits and therefore, they will not have any
employment bias. Employment in the private sector can be a useful benchmark for providing
incentives to the public sector managers. In other words, the private sector will not be part of a
culture of excess employment and be an independent source of information to discipline
public firm managers.
Consider the implications of this model in the context of Bangladesh. Our hypothesis
is that the central authorities were increasingly able to use yardstick competition, vis-à-vis the
private sector, as a way of controlling excess employment in the public sector relatively
cheaply. This hypothesis implies that public sector excess employment is likely to diminish
over time as the informational rents enjoyed by the public sector managers diminish.  In
addition, the preferences of the central authorities regarding excess employment may also
have changed over time.
Based on these considerations, our specification for employment in each category is as
follows:
ln(Eit) = ai + dt + btOit + eit
where ai is the firm-specific effect, dt  is the term capturing industry wide time varying effects,
and  eit is  a white-noise error term. Oit, the ownership dummy, takes a value of 1 when the
firm is publicly owned, and is zero if the firm is privately owned. The parameter of interest is ,
bt , which is the effect of ownership on employment. This is allowed to be period specific, in
order to capture the effect of the changing constraints upon public sector behaviour. Our
interest is on how the estimates of bt evolve over time.10
4. Empirical Results
The dynamics of public and private sector output and employment present an
interesting picture. We have the aggregate output levels for the two sector, but not the levels
on employment. We have firm-level employment figures for the two sectors, but not output
figures. Using both, this paper analyzes the relative changes in public sector employment.
Public sector output declined between 1983 and 1986, fluctuated thereafter, but never
recovered the 1983 level. The picture is different for the private sector. Total output increased
and remained above the 1983 level until 1992. (See table 1, figure 1). There is evidence of
increase in capacity in the private sector in our firm-level data set.
Table 2 presents the changes in average employment and capacity in the two sectors by
different categories of employees. We find an increase in white-collar categories between
1983 and 1988 despite a decline in average capacity. In the private sector, on the other hand,
average capacity increases, but employment declines in both white- collar and blue -collar
categories. Our new finding is that after 1988, public sector employment trends in white-collar
categories appear to track the trend in the private sector.
Tables 4 and 5 show the mean percentage changes in employment by category of
worker, for the public sector and private sector mills. We find that the public sectors had
significantly expanded the employment of all permanent workers (white-collar workers as
well as permanent manual workers) up to 1988, although total employment of manual workers
shows a slight decline. However, retrenchment occurred in subsequent years and by 1994,
there was a large decline in employment of all categories of workers. This was particularly
pronounced in the manual worker category, being over 50%. When compared with private
sector figures, we find that the decline in employment began in 1988 for the white-collar11
categories. Employment declined further in subsequent years, but the extent of retrenchment
was smaller than in the public sector and also more evenly distributed across white collar and
manual worker categories, as compared to the public sector.
Table 3 reports the evolution of aggregate output, sector-wise. Our focus is on the
years for which we have firm level employment data, i.e. the years 1988, 1991, 1992 and
1994. This table reports the percentage change in output in each of these years relative to
1983, for private and public sector mills. Public sector output contracted quite sharply- output
over these four years was, on average, 31% lower than its level in 1983. In contrast, the
private sector did not see such a decline and was on average almost 2% higher as compared to
1983, declining only in 1994. The final column of this table reports the difference in output
changes between the two sectors – on average, private sector output rose by 33% relative to
public sector output (see figure 2).
These output data suggest that one may use two alternative benchmarks to measure
“excess employment” in the public sector in any year. The first measure, which we label the
unadjusted measure, is the difference between the change in employment in the public sector
and the change in employment in the private sector, in that year, where the change is
computed relative to 1983.  This is the measure, which is used by Bhaskar and Khan (1995).
Alternatively, one can adjust this figure for the change in sectoral output. If we assume that
employment requirements for any category of worker are proportional to the output produced,
we should subtract the difference in output change between sectors from the unadjusted
measure of excess employment, to get the adjusted measure. Note here that in performing this
adjustment we are using aggregate sectoral outputs, rather than firm level outputs, since we do
not have data on firm level output.12
Our main results are shown in table 6, which presents measures for excess
employment, unadjusted as well as adjusted, for each category of worker and for each year in
our sample. Our results differ between the white-collar and manual categories, but are rather
similar within each of these categories. For white-collar employees, in 1988 there was a large
amount of excess employment, of the order of 30 percent by the unadjusted measure, for both
managers and clerical staff. However, unadjusted excess employment declines secularly in
subsequent years. Although the public sector still has positive excess employment by the end
of the period, this is not statistically significant. Indeed, there is no significant difference in
unadjusted excess employment in the category of clerical workers by 1994 and in managerial
workers by 1992. However, since the public sector suffered an output contraction relative to
the private sector, adjusted excess employment of white-collar workers is larger and remains
significant throughout this period. Nevertheless, excess employment does fall to the order of
25% by 1994.
For manual workers, the picture is rather different. Although there was no significant
excess employment of total manual workers in 1988, by the unadjusted measure, the output
contraction implied that the adjusted measure was of the order of 33%.  However, by 1991,
there was no significant excess employment, even by the adjusted figure. In other words, the
public sector appears to have shed manual workers more or less in line with its reduction in
output. ( The regression results are in tables 7 and 8)
5. Conclusions
Consistent with our assumption that the private sector is profit maximizing and suffers
from few informational asymmetries between owners and managers, employment of white-
collar workers fell dramatically following privatization in 1982.  The public sector did not13
immediately follow the private sector in reducing white-collar employment. However, from
1991 the employment levels in the public sector started to decline, although this decline was
less than the fall in relative sectoral output.  For manual workers, the fall in employment
mirrored that of relative output, so that there is no excess employment even by the adjusted
measure by the end of the period.
There are two interesting features of our results. First, the difference between white
collar and manual categories persists throughout this period, with the public sector
consistently focusing its employment generation upon the white-collar category. We have
suggested that this could be due to sociological reasons – decision-makers in the public sector
may have bonds of affinity with middle class employees, and would be less inclined to sack
them. Alternatively, this could be due to greater political voice of this educated and articulate
class. These explanations are obviously incomplete, and our work suggests a need for
explanations for such a white-collar bias within a populist political economy.
Our second interesting result is on the dynamics of public sector employment, whereby
excess employment is gradually reduced, in all categories. There could be two reasons for
such gradualism. The first is that over time, private sector behavior provided valuable
information to the central authorities and allowed them to control managers. Once the
informational rents of firm level managers had been revealed, pressure on managers and cuts
in subsidies forced the convergence with the private sector. The evidence that the Voluntary
Departure Scheme was adopted only reluctantly by public sector mill management, in
response to central pressure, is consistent with this interpretation. An alternative possibility is
that the central authorities initially had a higher employment preference in the jute sector but
external shocks forced them to evaluate the cost of employment creation through subsidies to14
jute manufacturing. This interpretation is consistent with the observation that the policy
response of the central authorities coincides with increased public sector losses in the early
nineties. This raised the subsidy required to maintain the existing employment levels. The
second interpretation is not inconsistent with the role of yardstick competition with the private
sector revealing rents. Indeed the information revealed by the private sectors earlier response
might have made the evaluation of the costs of employment creation explicit.15
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1983 399.4   170.5 569.9 184
1984 337.9  206.3 544.2 -310
1985 327.3  188.9 516.2 -1462
1986 275.1  182.9 458.0 -1583
1987 331.6  205.3 536.9 -420
1988 325.9  196.7 522.6 -1431
1989 316.9  185.8 502.7 -1882
1990 322.3  206.8 529.1 -3709
1991 260.5  173.4 433.9 -2473
1992  244.1 172.3 416.4 -3175
1993  282.9 162.9 445.8 -5216
1994 271.2  150.6 421.8 -587
Source: Quarterly Jute Good Statistics various issues,
World Bank (1992) Table 8.2, World Bank (1995) Table 5.5.17
TABLE 2:













1983 MANAGERIAL 122.19 465.2 72.19 248.8
CLERICAL 406.23 244.38
MANUAL 4636.29 2482.0
1988 MANAGERIAL 149.35 395.2 65.93 311.3
CLERICAL 450.26 212.97
MANUAL 4568.1 2407.8
1992 MANAGERIAL 110.68 395.2 62.42 341.3
CLERICAL 352.32 212.87
MANUAL 2799.5 2139.5
1994 MANAGERIAL 90.25 395.2 57.81 341.3
CLERICAL 279.9 173.77
MANUAL 2541.5 1893.9
NOTE: Number of mills: 31 state owned mills and 31 privatized mills   18
TABLE 3
PERCENTAGE CHANGE IN OUTPUT RELATIVE TO 1983
PUBLIC PRIVATE DIFFERENCE
1988 -18 +16 -34
1991 -35 +2 -37
1992 -39 +1 -40
1994 -32 -12 -2019
Table 4
PERCENTAGE CHANGE IN PUBLIC SECTOR EMPLOYMENT,
RELATIVE TO 1983
1988 1991 1992 1994
   MANAGERS
+22 +1 -8 -24
CLERICAL
+16 -5 -14 -30
TOTAL
MANUAL -4 -39 -50 -53
PERMANENT
MANUAL +14 -40 -39 -5020
Table 5
PERCENTAGE CHANGE IN PRIVATE SECTOR EMPLOYMENT,
RELATIVE TO 1983
1988 1991 1992 1994
   MANAGERS
-9 -9 -14 -25
CLERICAL
-12 -17 -16 -37
TOTAL
MANUAL -3 +6 -15 -27
+6 -8 -12 -27
PERMANENT
MANUAL21
Table 6: EXCESS EMPLOYMENT IN THE PUBLIC SECTOR (PERCENT)





































































Note: Unadjusted excess employment is the difference in difference estimate of (log)
employment, category wise. The adjusted figure subtracts the mean difference in difference in
log output between the two sectors.22
TABLE 7




























































Note: The t-ratio is given in parentheses.
* Significant at 10 per cent level.
** Significant at 5 percent level.23
TABLE 8












1988 TOTAL -0.04 -0.03 -0.01
(0.1)
PERMANENT 0.14 0.06 0.08
(2.0)*
1991 TOTAL -0.39 0.06 -.45
(7.8)**
PERMANENT -0.40 -0.08 -0.32
(7.9)**
1992 TOTAL -0.50 -0.15 -0.35
(6.0)**
PERMANENT -0.39 -0.12 -0.27
(6.8)**
1994 TOTAL -0.53 -.27 -0.26
(4.5)**
PERMANENT -0.50 -0.27 -0.23
(5.6)**24
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1982-83 1983-84 1984-85 1985-86 1986-87 1987-88 1988-89 1989-90 1990-91 1991-92 1992-93 1993-94
Period
PVT/PUB LOOMS
PVT/PUB OUTPUT